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Introduction
The Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) uses the Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) process to remove cesium (Cs) from alkaline waste. This process involves the use of an organic extractant, BoBCalixC6,  in an organic matrix to selectively remove Cs from the caustic waste. The organic solvent mixture flows counter-current to the caustic aqueous waste stream through the use of centrifugal contactors. After extracting the Cs, the loaded solvent is stripped of Cs by contact with dilute nitric acid (HNO 3 ) and the Cs concentrate is transferred to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), while the organic solvent is cleaned and recycled for further use. As of September 2011, MCU had processed three macrobatches of tank waste, and started processing a fourth macrobatch of material.
The Office of Waste Processing (EM-31) expressed an interest in investigating the further optimization of the organic solvent by replacing the BoBCalixC6 extractant with a more efficient extractant, a next generation CSSX solvent (NGS). 1 This replacement should yield dividends in improved Cs removal from the caustic waste stream, and higher caustic waste processing rates. To that end, EM-31 provided funding for both the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). SRNL wrote a Task Technical Quality and Assurance Plan (TTQAP) for this work. 2 Recently, SRR expressed concern that the affinity of NGS to extract and retain U and/or Pu is unknown, and this data is needed for safety calculations, in particular for the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) revision. SRR needs this information for the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) revision. The NCSE evaluates the possibility of criticality accidents in the Salt Solution Receipt Tank (SSRT) and Salt Solution Feed Tank (SSFT). The scenario postulates the presence of solvent in the SSRT or SSFT due to an unforeseen upset and extraction of fissile material into the solvent. The NCSE also evaluates the possibility of a criticality accident in the Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) decanter. The accident scenario postulates the decanter contains solvent that has extracted fissile material.
SRNL was tasked with assessing the affinity of the NGS for U and Pu after contacting salt solutions.
Experimental Procedure
For this work, SRNL took two paths. First, the archived organic phases from three previous Extraction-Scrub-Strip (ESS) tests were analyzed for Pu and U content. Second, two sets of contact tests were performed using two different aqueous simulants. In each set of contact tests, one portion of the aqueous phase was contacted with the current solvent, and another portion of the aqueous phase was contacted with NGS.
Analysis of Prior ESS Samples
Archived samples from three previous ESS tests were analyzed for Pu content via Plutonium Thenoyltrifluoroacetone (PuTTa). The samples sent forward are identified as Tests "F", "G" and "H" and the results from those ESS tests were previously reported. 
Simulant Feed Makeup and Compositions
A previously prepared spiked waste simulant was used in the first set of contact tests. This material is identified as "SWS-9-2007" and its composition is listed in Table 2 .
While the simulant does not precisely match the composition of the waste in Tank 49H, this was not the goal. The requirements for the contact tests were that the material approximate the type of caustic salt solution that the solvent would contact in actual use, and have a reasonable concentration of Pu and U present. The analytical uncertainty is 10% for all measurements except for the U, which is 6.62%.
In the case of the uranium, the simulant was prepared with depleted uranium (DU). After the initial preparation, a spike of 60% 235 U mass highly enriched uranium (HEU) was added to generate a final simulant with a high value of 235 U. This solution was then filtered through a 0.45m filter cup to ensure that the only U in solution was in a soluble form. While the initial value of the 238 U is known, after the spike of HEU, the 238 U was neither tracked nor analyzed.
Contact Testing
In each contact test, the same procedure was followed. Either 30 or 100 mL of the aqueous phase was placed in a Teflon™ separatory funnel. Researchers then added an amount of fresh, unused solvent equal to 1/10 th the volume of the aqueous phase. The contents of the funnel were hand mixed with medium agitation for 2 minutes. The funnel was then allowed to sit for an equilibrium time of one week. At that point samples were taken of one phase or another, and sent for analysis. Pu analysis was via PuTTa. Uranium analysis was via gamma radiocounting.
Results and Discussion

Results from Old Sample Analyses
The archived "F", "G" and "H" samples were analyzed for Pu content by PuTTa. As this is a direct-counting method, no additional sample preparation was required beyond the normal analytical method. The results of the analyses are shown in Table 4 , along with the calculated D-value. The D-value is calculated by dividing the sample (organic) result by the aqueous feed value (which varied from sample to sample). In all cases, the very low detection limits gave very low D-values. 238 Pu was used as opposed to 239/240 Pu as the latter gave less-than detectable results in both the samples and in the feed materials. Although not using the same exact experimental procedure, previous work at ORNL 7 gave a Pu D-value of ~1.6E-04 for tests involving the current BobCalix solvent formulation, which is comparable to the values in Table 4 . The gPu/g NGS is calculated by dividing the mass of Pu in a 1 mL sample of the analyzed NGS by the mass of the extractant in 1mL of NGS.
Results from Contact Tests
The first test failed to give reliable results due to higher than desired detection limits. SRNL performed a second contact test using a different simulant. The new simulant omitted beta/gamma emitters that interfere with the weak 235 U signal. The SWS-8-2007 simulant was chosen, and a portion of this material was spiked with HEU to increase the 235 U content. Table 5 contains the analytical results after the contact test. The D-value is calculated by dividing the sample (organic) result by the aqueous feed value (39.9 dpm/mL -see Table 3 ). Even in a low background, the weak activity of 235 U makes it difficult to count to lower values. A lower detection limit may be possible by going to more expensive counting isotopes and longer counting times.
The gU/g NGS is calculated by dividing the mass of U in a 1-mL sample of the analyzed NGS by the mass of the extractant in 1mL of NGS.
Conclusions
Analyses indicated that the NGS does not uptake either Pu or U within the analytical detection limits. This result is despite an extended contact time (1 week) with no scrubbing, stripping, or washing cycles and a high aqueous:organic volume phase ratio (10:1). The conditions of these tests are conservative compared to the actual operating conditions at the MCU.
